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CHAPTER 18 
State and Local Taxation 
§18.I. Sales and use tax: Governmental immunity: First Agricul-
tural National Bank of Berkshire County v. State Tax Commission.1 
The plaintiff is one of ninety national banks doing business in Massa-
chusetts. In order to carryon its banking operations, the bank must 
make purchases which are taxable under the state's Sales and Use 
Tax Act,2 and its vendors refuse to make such sales unless they are 
reimbursed for the taxes by the bank. On March 28, 1966, the plaintiff 
requested that the State Tax Commission rule national banks exempt 
from Massachusetts sales and use taxes. No ruling was received in 
answer to the request, and the plaintiff paid sales taxes to its vendors 
as required.3 On May 31, 1966, the Commission issued Emergency 
Regulation No.6, ruling that "the sale, lease or rental of tangible 
personal property to national banks and federal savings and loan as-
sociations is subject to the sales and use tax."4 On receipt of this 
regulation, the plaintiff filed a bill for declaratory relief, seeking a 
binding declaration of its exemption from the Massachusetts sales 
and use taxes on the ground that, as instrumentalities of the United 
States, national banks enjoy immunity from state taxation. The case 
first came before a single justice, and was reserved and reported with-
out decision. The Supreme Judicial Court HELD: federal governmen-
tal immunity from taxation by the states does not extend to purchases 
of tangible personal property made by national banks in Massachusetts. 
The state's sales and use tax, therefore, may be applied to such pur-
chases made by the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff based its claim for exemption from these taxes on 
three propositions: (1) that the bank, as an agency of the federal 
government, qualifies for the specific exemptions enumerated in the 
act;1i (2) that the application of the tax to the plaintiff violates the 
implied immunity of federal instrumentalities from state taxation; 
and (3) that the imposition of the tax on the plaintiff is contrary to 
congressional legislation.6 
The Court first examined the plaintiff's claim for a statutory 
exemption under Sections 1 and 2 of the act. Section 1, subsection 
§8.1. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1301, 229 N.E.2d 245. 
2 G.L., c. 58 App., §§I-l, 1-2. 
3 Total taxes paid by the plaintiff amounted to $575.66 from April I, 1966, to 
June 30, 1966. 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1032, 229 N.E.2d at 247. 
4Id. 
Ii G.L., c. 58 App., §1-l(6) (sales tax), and §1-2(5) (use tax). 
6 See 12 U.S.C. §548 (1964). 
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6(d), exempts from the sales tax "Sales to the United States, the 
commonwealth of Massachusetts or any political subdivision thereof, 
or their respective agencies." Section 2, subsection 5(b), exempts from 
the use tax out-of-state purchases made by those exempted from the 
sales tax by Section 1, subsection 6(d). In discussing this contention, 
the Court held that the intent of the legislature was to have "agency" 
mean "a regularly constituted department of government, or an entity 
which is wholly owned by the government and which exercises ex-
clusively governmental functions."7 The Court conceded that national 
banks are subject to supervision by the federal government,S and that 
they do perform certain governmental services. The Court ruled, how-
ever, that such performance is "incidental to [the bank's] primary 
purpose of returning a profit to its stockholders."9 The plaintiff, 
therefore, did not qualify for the explicit exemptions of Sections 1 
and 2 of the act. 
The Court next considered whether the imposition of a sales and 
use tax upon a national bank was prohibited by the United States 
Constitution. Subsection 6(a) of Section I of the Sales and Use Tax 
Act exempts from the operation of the sales tax "sales which the 
commonwealth is prohibited from taxing under the Constitution and 
laws of the United States." Section 2, subsection 5(b), applies the same 
limitation to the operation of the use tax. The United States Supreme 
Court has held that those taxes which directly burden either the gov-
ernment itself, or the exercise of the functions of government are vio-
lative of the Constitution.10 Such a burden has been found to exist 
where the legal obligation for payment of the tax falls upon the gov-
ernment.n The Supreme Judicial Court ruled that, for purposes of 
the sales tax, the vendor bears the legal obligation for the tax.12 Since 
the bank is not legally obligated to pay the tax, it is not an object of 
state taxation under that section of the act. The bank, therefore, could 
not assert implied governmental immunity in relation to the sales 
tax. 
The use tax provisions of the act, on the other hand, are expressly 
imposed on the purchaser.13 The use tax, therefore, represents a di-
rect tax upon the bank. The Court, however, found that because of 
their involvement in the private sphere of commercial banking, na-
tional banks no longer qualify for exemptions from state taxation as 
federal instrumentalities. Therefore, imposition of the use tax would 
result in no unconstitutional interference with any federal instru-
mentality. 
Finally, the Court discussed whether the imposition of a state use 
71967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1305, 229 N.E.2d at 248. 
SId. at 1304, 229 N.E.2d at 248. 
9Id. 
10 See Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. 5 (1873). 
11 Kern-Limerick Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 121-122 (1953). 
12See G.L., c. 58 App., §§1-1(10), 1-1(15)(b), 1-1(16), 1-1(17). 
13 Id. at § 1-2(11). 
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1967 [1967], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1967/iss1/21
§18.1 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 291 
tax upon a national bank contravenes Section 548 of Title 12 of the 
United States Code, which defines the manner in which states may 
tax the income produced by national banks located within the taxing 
state.14 The language of Section 548 contains no express prohibition 
of a state-imposed use tax on national banks. The Court reasoned 
that since Congress has the power to create exemptions from taxation 
by express declaration, if it omits to do so, no exemption may be 
created by implication.15 Ruling that Section 548 does not set an outer 
limit upon state power to tax national banks,16 the Court rejected the 
last of the plaintiff's claims. 
The Supreme Judicial Court based its conclusions on the premise 
that, since national banks do not meet the test presently applied by 
the United States Supreme Court for determining if an entity is a 
governmental instrumentality, they do not qualify for the immunity 
from state taxation to which such instrumentalities are entitled.17 The 
essential question, therefore, is whether the Court was correct in con-
cluding that national banks are not federal instrumentalities within 
the United States Supreme Court's definition. In attempting to answer 
that question, the following discussion will trace the development of 
the Supreme Court's test for determining whether a given entity is a 
federal instrumentality, and will analyze the distinctions which have 
been made to classify instrumentalities as either governmental or non-
governmental. The test will then be applied to national banks to de-
termine whether they may be considered federal instrumentalities. 
The Constitution of the United States does not expressly protect 
from state interference those instrumentalities through which the 
United States chooses to carry out its functions and responsibilities. 
A rule of intergovernmental immunity, implied from the supremacy18 
and necessary and proper19 clauses of the Constitution, was laid down 
by the United States Supreme Court in M'Culloch v. Maryland. 20 
M'Culloch established the principle that a state may not levy any tax 
which would "retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the 
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry 
into execution the powers vested in the general government."21 
Where Congress has chosen to empower an instrumentality to carry 
14 Section 548 provides in part: "The several states may (1) tax said shares, or 
(2) include dividends derived therefrom in the taxable income of an owner or 
holder thereof, or (3) such associations on their net income, or (4) according to or 
measured by their net income .... " 
The section also declares that the above taxation must be non-discriminatory, 
that is, national banks may not be taxed at a higher rate than other banks doing 
business within the state. Moreover, states are not prohibited from imposing a 
non-discriminatory tax on real estate owned by the banks within the taxing state. 
151967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1323, 229 N.E.2d at 260. 
16Id. at 1322-1323, 229 N.E.2d at 259. 
17Id. at 1317-1318, 229 N.E.2d at 256-257. 
18 V.S. Const. art. VI. 
19 Id. art. I, §8. 
20 17 V.S. 316 (1819). 
21 Id. at 436. 
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out federal functions, a state may tax neither those functions, nor the 
privilege of exercising them.22 
In early considerations of state taxation of governmental instru-
mentalities, the Supreme Court tried to determine what situations 
would warrant its intervening to limit the state action. A remote 
effect on the "efficient exercise of the Federal power could not, for 
that reason alone, be considered a prohibited exercise of state 
power."23 The interference must amount to more than a mere token 
or theoretical effect. Accordingly, a test was established in Railroad 
Co. v. Peniston)24 which provided that, for a state tax to be struck 
down, it must represent some measurable hindrance to the exercise 
of federal functions. In Peniston) the Supreme Court was called upon 
to consider whether property used in the operation of a federally 
chartered railroad was a legitimate object of state taxation. The Court 
ruled that the exemption of federally chartered instrumentalities from 
the reach of state taxation depended "not upon the nature of the 
agents, or upon the mode of their constitution, or upon the fact that 
they are agents, but upon the effect of the tax .... "25 In other words, 
the question to be asked was whether the tax applied to the alleged 
federal instrumentality, in fact, deprived the instrumentality of the 
power to perform its governmental functions.26 The tax in Peniston 
was found to be not upon the agent's activities on behalf of the gOV" 
ernment, but on the property belonging to the agent. The Court held 
that a tax on the railroad's property "leaves them free to discharge 
the duties they have undertaken to perform. A tax upon their opera-
tions is a direct obstruction to the exercise of Federal powers."27 
The Peniston principle eventually merged into the "economic 
burden" test established in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. 
Knox.28 There the Court declared that: 
The States may not burden or interfere with the exertion of na-
tional power or make it a source of revenue or take the funds 
raised or tax the means used for the performance of federal func-
tions .... While [a state] may impose charges ... for the privilege 
of carrying on trade that is subject to the power of the State, it 
may not lay any tax upon transactions by which the United States 
secures the things desired for its governmental purposes.29 
Specifically, Panhandle Oil declared that a state franchise tax on the 
privilege of selling gasoline was unconstitutional as applied to instru-
22 Traynor, National Bank Taxation in California, 17 Calif. L. Rev. 83, 85 
(1929). 
23 Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. 5, 30 (1873). 
24Id. 
25Id. at 36. 
26Id. 
27 Id. at 36-37. 
28277 U.S. 218 (1928). 
29Id. at 221. 
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mentalities of the United States. In Peniston, the Supreme Court had 
outlawed those state taxes which represented some "measurable hin-
drance" to the exercise of federal functions. Panhandle Oil narrowed 
the states' taxing powers by declaring that no interference with na-
tional activities would be allowed. 
Under a more recent trend, developed in cases decided over the 
last thirty years, the broad exemptions allowed under the Panhandle 
Oil rule have been limited in favor of a more selective approach to 
granting immunities. In these cases, the Supreme Court has sought 
to distinguish between interests which are truly governmental in 
character, and those which are actually private activities seeking shel-
ter from state taxation on grounds that the work they perform is 
for the government.so 
The first major departure from the earlier broad grants of immunity 
suggested that the fact that a tax results in an economic burden 
upon the government is not sufficient, by itself, to condemn a tax on 
private persons dealing with the government. The problem initially 
arose in situations where private industry was hired by the United 
States to perform various contracts for the government.S1 States felt 
that these private concerns, as part of the private economy, were sub-
ject to the states' taxing powers, in the same manner as any other 
private industry located within the taxing state. The industries, on 
the other hand, sought exemption from the tax on the ground that 
they would otherwise be forced to charge the government a higher 
price for the goods or services provided. The earlier "economic bur-
den" test of Panhandle Oil would have extended an immunity from 
state taxes in such a situation. The Supreme Court, however, pro-
ceeded to distinguish between those activities which are truly those 
of the government, or are so bound up with government as to be 
considered governmental, and those activities which are undertaken 
by private individuals in pursuit of private gain. 
Such a situation was presented in the case of James v. Dravo Con-
tracting CO.,32 which involved work to be performed for the United 
States under a cost-plus, fixed-fee contract. West Virginia had imposed 
a tax on the business of contracting, based on gross income. Dravo 
sought to escape the tax because it would be assessed, in part, on the 
basis of work being performed for the government, and would ulti-
mately be passed onto the United States in a higher cost figure. Dravo 
contended that this would be, in substance, a tax on the United States 
itself. 
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, and ruled the tax valid 
as applied to the income earned by Dravo from its government con-
tract. Private contractors, under contract to the government, could be 
taxed even if the economic burden of the tax was passed on to the 
30 See United States v. Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 186 (1944). 
31 E.g., James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937). 
3:1ld. 
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United States. The Court distinguished the Panhandle Oil rule, and 
held that it was limited to those situations where sales were made di-
rectly to the government of the United States.aa Following Dravo, 
similar reasoning was applied when exemptions were sought from 
state taxes on materials purchased for government contracts. Such 
purchases were held taxable even though the materials purchased 
were incorporated into the finished product for the government.S4 
The Dravo case indicated that, for an entity to enjoy the immunity 
of a "governmental instrumentality," it is not enough that it is work-
ing on behalf of the government and that any state taxation of it would 
have some ultimate economic effect on the United States. To qualify 
as a governmental instrumentality, the entity seeking that status must 
be either a specifically designated agency of the government, or be so 
closely connected with the government that its activities must be con-
sidered governmental. Once an entity has qualified for the status of 
a governmental instrumentality, however, the question remains 
whether the function or feature which the state wishes to tax is itself 
governmental. A governmental instrumentality may claim an im-
munity from state taxation only when the activity taxed is one of 
government. Thus, although the United States Supreme Court held 
that the Port of New York Authority and the Federal Home Owners' 
Loan Corporation were governmental instrumentalities, it refused to 
extend the instrumentalities' immunity from taxation to encompass 
the salaries of their employees. 
Prior to 1938, the immunity granted to a governmental instrumen-
tality included the salaries paid to its employees.311 The Supreme 
Court, however, modified this doctrine in Helvering v. Gerhardt,S6 
where an employee of the Port of New York Authority was held liable 
for federal income taxes, and finally abolished it in Graves v. New 
York ex rei. O'Keefe,37 where an employee of the Federal Home 
Owners' Loan Corporation was held liable for New York State in-
come taxes. The Court conceded that the removal of such an im-
munity would result in an increased cost upon the government which 
the employees served. The Supreme Court, however, did not regard 
such an increased cost as resulting in any "tangible or certain eco-
nomic burden" on the employer-government.s8 Where the particular 
function of the agency which is taxed does not serve a governmental 
purpose, it will not be granted an immunity. The purpose of such 
immunities is not to protect the individual but rather "to prevent un-
due interference" with the activities of government.39 
In addition to taxation which represents an undue interference 
with governmental activity, states are also barred from imposing such 
33 Id. at 151. 
34 E.g., Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. I, 8·9 (1941). 
35 New York ex reI. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401, 408 (1937). 
36304 U.S. 405 (1938). 
37306 U.S. 466, 486 (1939). 
38 Id. at 486. 
39 Graves v. New York ex reI. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 483·484 (1939). 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1967 [1967], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1967/iss1/21
§18.l STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 295 
taxation where the legal obligation for payment is directly on the 
United States. In this area, it would appear that the Supreme Court 
frequently exalts form over substance to establish the taxability or 
non-taxability of the particular entity involved. In United States v. 
A llegheny40 a state use tax was levied on machinery, which was lo-
cated in and used by a privately owned manufacturing plant. The 
title to the machinery was vested in the United States. Declaring that 
its purpose in this area was "to withdraw private property and profits 
from the shelter of governmental immunity but without impairing 
the immunity of the State and Nation itself,"41 the Supreme Court, 
however, held that the property of the United States, although con-
tributing to private profit, was beyond the taxing power of the states. 
The tax involved was an ad valorem tax on all machinery in the 
manufacturing plant, and the assessment included the machinery 
owned by the United States. In United States v. Detroit,42 the city of 
Detroit assessed a tax on the use, by private lessees for private profit, 
of tax-exempt real estate. The title to the property was vested in the 
United States. The assessment was computed on the basis of the 
freehold, and the holder of the term was obligated to pay. Under 
the rationale of Allegheny J such a tax, assessed in direct measurement 
of the property interest of the United States, could not be allowed. 
The form of the Detroit tax, however, was to tax the leasehold 
(measured by the freehold) and charge the lessee for his use. The 
Supreme Court allowed the city to tax the privately used, govern-
ment-owned property. 
The employment cases suggest that an instrumentality of govern-
ment is immune from state taxation when it performs a governmental 
function; Allegheny and Detroit indicate that a similar immunity 
exists where the legal incidence of the tax is upon the United States. 
The crucial test is the direction of the tax: not how it is collected, 
or where the ultimate economic burden for its payment lies, but 
where the legal obligation for its payment rests.43 A state tax on an 
instrumentality of government will be struck down only if the United 
States is the legal taxpayer, either itself, or acting through an instru-
mentality engaged in a distinctly governmental activity. 
To determine whether the First Agricultural National Bank quali-
fies for the immunity sought in the instant case, two things must be 
shown: first, that national banks qualify as governmental instrumen-
talities under the Supreme Court test outlined above; and second, 
that the Massachusetts use tax was imposed upon a distinctly govern-
mental activity of the bank. 
National banks were created in 1864 by Congressional legislation 
which, as subsequently amended, became the National Bank Act.44 
40322 U.S. 174 (1944). 
41Id. at 186. 
42 355 U.S. 466 (1958). 
43 Powell, Remnants of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 
757, 758 (1945). 
44 See 12 U.S.C. §38. 
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National banks operate in a dual role, pursuing a private profit-
making purpose, as well as fulfilling certain public duties.45 All of 
their activities are subject to the regulation of the United States gov-
ernment.46 In the years following the establishment of national 
banks, the Supreme Court consistently declared national banks to be 
federal instrumentalities. Any attempt by a state to define the duties 
of the banks, or to control their activities, was declared void. Ac-
cording to Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank,47 national banks were 
"created for a public purpose, and as such [are] necessarily subject to 
the paramount authority of the United States."48 The Supreme Court 
affirmed this rule in 1899, in Owensboro National Bank v. Owens-
boro,49 where the Court invalidated a state franchise tax on the 
operations of all banks, which tax included national banks. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, considering the status of national 
banks in the instant case, found "little resemblance between the 
operation of today's national bank and that of national banks which 
existed at the time the Owensboro case was decided by the Supreme 
Court."50 First Agricultural's claim for immunity must be judged 
"according to contemporary conditions under principles enunciated 
in the more recent Supreme Court decisions . . . ."1S1 The establish-
ment of the Federal Reserve System deprived national banks of many 
of their responsibilities as fiscal agents of the United States.52 At the 
same time, activities of national banks in the private sphere of bank-
ing increased markedly. The Massachusetts Court thus reasoned that 
today there are few significant differences between national banks and 
state chartered banks.53 The Court concluded that "we do not find 
these differences sufficient to exempt the plaintiff from the imposition 
of a nondiscriminatory tax of general application such as the use tax 
imposed by §2 of the Act."54 
Since the Owensboro decision, not only has the governmental role 
of national banks narrowed, but their participation in the sphere of 
commercial banking has expanded to the point that national banks 
45 See 12 U S.C. §§89, 90, 141-143, 162. 
46 On receipt of their charter from the Comptroller of the Currency, national 
banks are authorized "to exercise, by [their] board of directors ... subject to law, 
all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carryon the business of banking." 
12 U.S.C. §28(7). National banks also possess fiduciary powers, id. §92(a); may 
extend loans and accept savings deposits, id. §371; and must file regular reports 
on their condition to the United States Treasury, and be regularly examined by 
the Comptroller of the Currency, id. §161. The statute also prescribes such details 
as the requisite initial capitalization, id. §51(b); and places a limit on the in-
debtedness which banks may incur, id. §82. 
47 161 U.S. 275 (1896). 
48 Id. at 283. 
49173 U.S. 664 (1899). 
501967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1312, 229 N.E.2d at 253. 
51Id. 
52Id. at 1314-1315, 229 N.E.2d at 254-255. 
53 Id. at 1316, 229 N.E.2d at 255. 
54 Id. at 1317,229 N.E.2d at 256. 
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compete with state chartered banks in seeking investors and cus-
tomers. As the role of national banks has become more diversified, 
the taxes which the states have attempted to levy upon them have 
become more varied. At the time when the broad declarations of 
immunity were made, the state taxes levied upon national banks were 
more likely to fall on the banks in their governmental capacity. In 
some cases, the tax was a franchise tax on the general privilege of 
banking.55 In others, the resulting state taxation discriminated against 
money invested in national banks in favor of the money in state banks, 
discouraging investment in the former in favor of the latter. 56 These 
taxes had to be struck down if national banks were to survive. 
Today, however, the private nature of national banks has over-
shadowed their governmental function. Dictum of the United States 
Supreme Court in Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Western Union Tele-
graph CO.57 emphasized this dual nature of national banks: "Instru-
mentalities like the national banks . . . , in which there are private 
interests, are not departments of Government. They are private cor-
porations in which the Government has an interest."58 It is sub-
mitted that, when discussing national banks, a distinction should be 
drawn between their dual natures: that of agent of the United States, 
and that of commercial banking institution. When they act as agents 
of the government, national banks should be entitled to the immunity 
of a federal instrumentality; when acting as commercial banking in-
stitutions, they should be subject to the same restrictions and regula-
tions as their state-chartered equivalents. 
A reflection of this dual nature may be found in various cases 
where national banks, acting as commercial banking institutions, 
have been held subject to the same regulations - federal and state-
as their state-chartered counterparts. A corporate consolidation in-
volving a national bank, where the resulting institution would control 
an undue percentage of the banking market, has been held subject to 
the provisions of the Sherman Act59 and of the Clayton Act.60 The 
National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction over labor disputes 
involving employees of a national bank.61 State regulation of national 
banks has been upheld in some instances. In Anderson National Bank 
v. LuckettJ 62 the United States Supreme Court upheld the right of a 
state to enforce escheat of presumptively abandoned deposits left 
untouched for a statutory period, against savings deposits in national 
banks. In allowing the state to exercise its power here, the Court 
55 Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 u.s. 664, 669 n.l (1899). 
56 Iowa-Des Moines Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 244 (1931). 
57275 u.s. 415 (1928). 
58 Id. at 425-426. 
59 United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 376 u.s. 665, 669·670 (1964). 
60 United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 u.s. 321, 371 (1963). 
61 NLRB v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn., 130 F.2d 624, 626· 
627 (9th Cir. 1942). 
62321 u.s. 233 (1944). 
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pointed out that national banks are subject to state regulation "unless 
those [state] laws infringe the performance of the banks' functions."6s 
Since the Massachusetts sales and use tax is not directed specifically 
against national banks in their governmental function, it is clear that 
the tax is not unconstitutional on its face. The tax, however, is 
patently non-discriminatory, making no distinction, in its application 
to national banks, between their public and private functions. In 
upholding the constitutionality of the tax, the Supreme Judicial Court 
also failed to distinguish between these two functions of the banks. It 
is submitted that insofar as the Court's decision in First Agricultural 
may be read to uphold state taxation of a national bank, exercising a 
governmental function, the decision is in error. 
Although state taxation of national banks functioning in their pri-
vate capacities may not be violative of the Constitution, it remains to 
be seen whether the imposition of such tax would conflict with spe-
cific congressional legislation. Specific permission to the states to tax 
national banks appears in 12 U.S.C. §548.64 National banks are thereby 
protected from unfriendly discrimination by the states in the exercise 
of their taxing powers.65 In stating that the states are "wholly without 
power to levy any tax, either direct or indirect, upon the national 
banks, their property, assets or franchises,"66 the Supreme Court in 
Owensboro held that this section of the statute is 
the measure of the power of a State to tax national banks, their 
property or their franchises. By its unambiguous provisions the 
power is confined to a taxation of the shares of stock in the names 
of the shareholders and to an assessment of the real estate of the 
bank. Any state tax therefore which is in excess of and not in con-
formity to those requirements is void.67 [Emphasis added.] 
Under the provisions of Section 548, therefore, certain methods of 
taxation of national banks are specifically allowed to the states, and it 
is declared that those methods will not be regarded as an interference 
with the purpose of Congress in creating national banks. This, in 
turn, would seem to imply that all other methods and degrees of 
taxation will be considered an interference with the Congressional 
purpose.6S 
The holding in Owensboro, that Section 548 sets an outer limit to 
the states' power to tax national banks, has served as the basis for 
decisions in cases, similar to First Agricultural, which have recently 
been argued before state courts in New York and South Dakota. In 
Liberty National Bank v. Buscaglia/39 the Appellate Division of the 
63 Id. at 248. 
64 See note 14 supra. 
65 First National Bank v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 341, 347-348 (1926). 
66 Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 668 (1899). 
67 Id. at 669. 
6S Traynor, note 22 supra, at 91-93. 
6926 App. Div. 2d 97, 270 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1966). As the Survey was going to press, 
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Supreme Court of the State of New York rejected the argument that 
the nature of national banks has changed since the days of M'Culloch 
and Owensboro, and that precedent holdings that national banks are 
always governmental instrumentalities are no longer necessarily 
valid.70 Their rejection of the argument was based on the United 
States Supreme Court's statement in Colorado National Bank v. 
Bedford,71 that although the usefulness of a national bank as "an 
agency to provide for currency has diminished markedly," its opera-
tions are still subject to state taxation only as permitted by Congress.72 
Stating that "possessions, institutions and activities of the Federal 
Government itself" may not be taxed in the absence of Congressional 
permission, the New York court barred the imposition of a state and 
county sales and use tax on a national bank. 
The Supreme Court of South Dakota, in Northwestern National 
Bank of Sioux Falls v. Gillis,73 discussed the application of a state use 
tax to purchases of materials for use by a national bank. The South 
Dakota court held that the use tax was directed against the bank when 
it was assessed upon materials for use by the bank in its banking busi-
ness. The court felt that Section 548 set the outer limit of state taxing 
power over national banks. Therefore, since the state statute required 
the bank to pay the assessment directly to the State Commissioner of 
Revenue, the South Dakota court held the tax to be prohibited by 
Section 548.74 
The Massachusetts decision is clearly inconsistent with holdings of 
the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Judicial Court, recog-
nizing this conflict, suggested, however, that, in light of the changed 
status of national banks, the United States Supreme Court should 
reconsider its holding in Owensboro, especially insofar as it interprets 
12 U.S.C. §548 as setting the outer limit of state power to tax national 
banks.75 
Two conclusions clearly follow from the above analysis. First, when 
a national bank acts in its public capacity, exercising wholly govern-
mental functions, it is within the Supreme Court's definition of a 
governmental instrumentality. As such, it should be immune from 
state taxation. Secondly, where a national bank engages in an exclu-
sively private, commercial activity, in competition with state chartered 
banks, the bank is without the Supreme Court's definition of federal 
instrumentality. Consequently, the means used by a national bank to 
the New York Court of Appeals, with approving citation to First Agricultural, 
reversed the Appellate Division and held national banks subject to the sales and 
use taxes. Liberty National Bank v. Buscaglia, 21 N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, 
N.Y.S.2d - (1968). 
70Id. at 99-100, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 874. 
71 310 U.S. 41 (1940). 
7226 App. Div. 2d at 100, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 874, citing Colorado National Bank v. 
Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 48 (1940). 
73148 N.W.2d 293 (S.D. 1967). 
74 Id. at 297. 
751967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1312, 229 N.E.2d at 253. 
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engage in competition with private banks should be subject to the 
same taxation as are the activities of private banks. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, however, has not discussed what 
would result if a state tax were levied on materials purchased for use 
in both the private and the public business of the bank. The Court 
tacitly assumed that the materials taxed in the instant case were pur-
chased for use in the plaintiff's commercial activities. A fuller discus-
sion of this situation would appear crucial, however, because of the 
likelihood that the national bank uses such items as office machinery 
and supplies, for example, in furtherance of both its governmental 
and commercial functions. It is submitted that where the use of ma-
terials is allocable between the bank's federal and commercial func-
tions, the tax might be pro-rated as to the percentage of use for the 
particular functions, and the private activities be taxed. Thereby, 
those elements engaged in competition with other banks would not 
escape taxation. 
Where, on the other hand, the public and private functions are so 
integrated that no allocation would be practicable, a more difficult 
problem is presented. If the activity were taxed because of its private or 
"commercial" nature, then such taxation would necessarily be upon 
the federal activity. It is submitted that the best solution would be to 
place the entire transaction beyond the reach of state taxation. Other-
wise there would be direct interference with a governmental activity. 
Only when the result reached by the Supreme Judicial Court is modi-
fied, as described above, will it comport with the United States Su-
preme Court's endeavor "to withdraw private property and profits 
from the shelter of governmental immunity but without impairing 
the immunity of the State and Nation itsel£."76 
]ACEK A. WYSOCKI 
§18.2. Property tax exemption: Charitable organization: Children's 
Hospital Medical Center v. Board of Assessors of Boston.1 In 1959, 
Children's Hospital Medical Center and six other Boston hospitals, all 
charitable corporations, formed a committee to investigate the estab-
lishment of a central laundry facility which would serve them on a 
cooperative basis. The committee concluded from their investigation 
that the projected volume of laundry could not be handled com-
mercially and that a central laundry would satisfy the hospitals' needs 
more effectively and less expensively than separate laundry facilities 
operated by each hospital. The hospitals then embarked upon a plan 
to establish the Hospital Laundry Association. In March 1961, the 
association was incorporated as a nonprofit corporation, by representa-
tives of Children's and six other hospitals. The association's corporate 
purposes were to operate facilities to do laundry work for nonprofit 
76 United States v. Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 186 (1944). 
§18.2. 1 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1151, 227 N.E.2d 908. 
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Massachusetts hospitals and medical schools. Each organizing hospital 
made a substantial financial contribution to the association and fol-
lowing its incorporation entered into a contract under which the 
association would do its laundry work for ten years. 
Prior to the association's incorporation, Children's Hospital had 
purchased real estate on Ipswich Street in Boston for itself or as trustee 
for the association for the purposes of converting what was then a 
garage into a central laundry. Children's conveyed this real estate to 
the association upon its incorporation. In October 1961, the associa-
tion's laundry began actual operation. 
Children's Hospital claimed a tax exemption on the Ipswich Street 
property for 1961, and the association claimed an exemption on the 
same property and on its personal property for 1962 and 1963. The 
statute under which both organizations claimed exemption was Gen-
eral Laws, Chapter 59, Section 5, the pertinent portions of which 
exempts from taxation "personal property ... and real estate owned 
by or held in trust for a charitable organization and occupied by it ... 
for the purposes for which it is organized .... " In order for an organi-
zation to be granted an exemption under the statute it must show: 
(1) that it is a charitable organization; and (2) that its real estate is 
owned and occupied for the purposes for which it is organized. Since 
Children's Hospital concededly was a charitable organization, the 
issue here was whether it owned and occupied the property for the 
purposes for which it was organized. Unlike the hospital, the associa-
tion had clearly owned and occupied the property for the purposes 
for which it was organized. The issue as to the association, therefore, 
was whether it had met the statute's first requirement of being a 
charitable organization. 
From the refusal of the assessors to make abatements on the Ipswich 
Street property, Children's Hospital and the association appealed to 
the Appellate Tax Board. The Board upheld the assessors' decision 
as to Children's Hospital on the ground in preparing the property as 
a central laundry which was to be separately incorporated the hospital 
had owned and occupied the property for purposes other than those 
for which it was organized.2 The Board held that the association's 
corporate purpose of laundering linens and clothing for medical 
institutions was no more a charitable purpose than laundering linens 
and clothing for any other class of institutions, and, therefore, the 
association was not a charitable organization within the meaning of 
the exemption statute.3 
Reversing on appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court HELD: (1) Chil-
dren's Hospital owned and occupied the property in accordance with 
powers granted charitable hospitals under Acts of 1959, Chapter 283, 
in furtherance of its function of caring for the ill. Therefore, Chil-
dren's had owned and occupied the property "for purposes for which 
2 Record at 14-15. 
3 Id. at 15-18. 
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it was organized." (2) The association's purpose - to conduct an inci-
dental hospital function for charitable organizations - was a chari-
table purpose. The association was, therefore, a charitable organiza-
tion. Consequently, both the hospital and the association were entitled 
to the tax exemption. 
The conflict between the Appellate Tax Board and the Supreme 
Judicial·· Court as to the hospital centered around whether it had 
owned and occupied the Ipswich Street property for the purposes for 
which it was organized. The focal point of the conflict was the inter-
pretation of the word "purposes." To the Tax Board, "purposes" 
meant the reasons for which the charitable organization was organized. 
From this interpretation the Board reasoned that since Children's 
was holding the property as a laundry, but had been organized as a 
hospital, it had not complied with the proviso of the exemption 
statute.4 The Supreme Judicial Court held that such an interpretation 
was too restrictive. The Court expanded the Board's interpretation 
of "purposes" to include within its meaning that use of property 
which is a valid exercise of powers specifically conferred by the 
legislature. The Court's underlying rationale was that where an or-
ganization is simply exercising such a conferred power, it would be 
anomalous to deprive the organization of its legislatively granted tax 
exemption. The Court found that Children's Hospital was exercising 
such a specially conferred power, granted by Acts of 1959, Chapter 
283. By virtue of Section 5 of this statute, the hospital had the power: 
to form ... with such other charitable corporations . . . an al-
liance for, and otherwise to cooperate in, establishing, maintain-
ing and operating a medical center and to render mutual services 
and operate one or more plants in common in connection with 
such medical center. 
On its face, the statute would seem to require that Children's 
Hospital, in concert with the other six charitable hospitals, utilize the 
Ipswich Street property as a laundry "in connection with a medical 
center" either formed or shortly to be formed by them. The record 
gives no indication that Children's or the other six hospitals had any 
intention of establishing such a medical center. To the contrary, the 
record discloses that the property owned and occupied by Children's 
was being prepared as a central laundry for separate medical centers 
already established. Consequently, the Supreme Judicial Court gave a 
strained construction to Acts of 1959, Chapter 283, not justified by any 
precedent or by any manifestations of legislative intent.1i 
The Court, however, looked not only to the word "purposes," but 
also the phrase "for the purposes," and construed this phrase to in-
clude within its meaning such use of property as is reasonably 
related to the charitable purposes of the organization. The Court 
4Id. at 14. 
5 See Brief for Appellee at 7·8. 
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reasoned that since Children's owned and occupied the property as a 
laundry, and the cleansing of linens and clothing for hospital patients 
is directly related to one of Children's aims, that of providing the 
public with sanitary hospital services, it is within the statutory exemp-
tion. The Court's interpretation was not a novel one. As early as 1868, 
in the case of Trustees of Wesleyan Academy v. Inhabitants of Wilbra-
ham,6 the Court interpreted "purpose" to include the use of property 
which is directly related to primary charitable activity.7 Such an inter-
pretation appears to be justified. To hold otherwise, the Court in 
Children's noted, would be to "unsoundly fragmentize"8 the various 
component activities of these organizations. 
In addition to the arguments the Court used to justify its decision, 
there was another argument which it might have used to buttress its 
holding that Children's Hospital had owned the Ipswich Street prop-
erty for the purposes for which it was organized. In the past, the 
Court has stated that managing officers of a charitable corporation 
are vested with considerable discretion as to what use of corporate 
property will best promote the charitable purposes of the organiza-
tion. In Assessors of Dover v. Dominican Fathers Province of St. 
Joseph,9 the Court stated: 
The rule deducible from our decisions is that what lands are 
reasonably required, and what uses of the land will promote the 
purposes for which the institution was incorporated, must be 
determined by its own officers. So long as they act in good faith 
and not unreasonably in determining how to occupy and use the 
real estate of the corporation their determination will not be 
interfered with by the courts. lO 
Applying this standard to the facts of the present case, the officers of 
Children's were, in effect, entitled to a presumption that the acquisi-
tion of the Ipswich Street property, and the occupation of it for 
preliminary steps towards its conversion to use for a cooperative cen-
tral laundry facility, would be in the best interests of Children's. 
Therefore, their ownership would be in furtherance of the purposes 
for which the hospital was organized.!1 The Court's failure to use 
this approach could possibly be interpreted as an indication of a 
desire to limit the application of the Dover rule. 
In addition to the requirement that Children's Hospital own the 
property for the purposes for which it was organized, it was also neces-
sary that it "occupy" the Ipswich Street property for those purposes 
in order to claim the tax exemption. In its most recent interpretation 
699 Mass. 599 (1868). 
7Id. at 604. 
81967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1157, 227 N.E.2d at 912. 
9334 Mass. 530, 137 N.E.2d 225 (1956). 
10Id. at 540·541, 137 N.E.2d at 231. 
11 See Brief for Appellants at 13-14; Reply Brief for Appellants at 2, 3. 
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of the statute's occupancy requirement, the Supreme Judicial Court 
stated: 
Such occupancy means something more than that which results 
from simple ownership and possession. It signifies as active ap-
propriation to the immediate uses of the charitable cause for 
which the owner was organized .... [T]he nature of the occupa-
tion must be such as to contribute immediately to the promotion 
of the charity and physically to participate in the forwarding of 
its beneficent objects.12 [Emphasis added.] 
The hospital had purchased the property and had renovated it so that 
the association could use it as a laundry. However, it had not "oc-
cupied" the property while laundry work was performed there. Thus, 
it would appear that under the active, immediate use test, the hospital 
failed to meet the "occupancy" requirements. The Court stated that 
this approach was "entitled to very slight weight .... "13 It would 
appear, thus, that the Court was accepting preparation towards active 
use as sufficient to qualify for "occupancy."14 The apparent purpose 
of the occupancy requirement is to prevent charities from allowing 
land to lie dormant, and at the same time to insure that only that 
property which contributes to the charitable function be tax exempt.15 
These purposes are satisfied when the organization is taking positive 
steps toward utilizing the real estate. Thus, the Court's implicit quali-
fication of the active use test is justified. 
The issue raised by the association's appeal- whether the associa-
tion was a charitable organization - presented a more difficult ques-
tion. It is generally recognized that the typical charitable organization 
provides benefits directly to the members of the public by bringing 
their "hearts and minds" under the influence of education or religion, 
by relieving their bodies from suffering or disease, or by assisting them 
to establish themselves in society.16 The association, on the other hand, 
did not directly benefit the general public, but merely assisted chari-
table organizations which rendered benefits directly to the public. 
Consequently, the underlying issue which faced the Supreme Judicial 
Court was whether an organization whose dominant purpose is to aid 
charities to perform their charitable functions is itself charitable in 
nature. 
In answering in the affirmative the Court emphasized three con-
12 Board of Assessors of Boston v. Vincent Club, 351 Mass. 10, 14, 217 N.E.2d 
757, 760 (1966), quoting Babcock v. Leopold Morse Home for Infirm Hebrews & 
Orphanage, 225 Mass. 418, 421-422, 114 N.E. 712, 712-713 (1917). But see Trinity 
Church v. Boston, 118 Mass. 164 (1875); New England Hospital v. Boston, 113 
Mass. 518 (1873). 
13 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1156, 227 N.E.2d at 912. 
14 See Brief for Appellants at 12-13. 
15 See G.L., c. 59, §5, which exempts: "real estate purchased by a charitable 
organization with the purpose of removal thereto, until such removal, but not 
for more than two years after such purchase. . . ." 
16 Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 556 (1867). 
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trolling factors in deciding the issue: (1) the character of those par-
ticipating in the benefits provided by the organization, (2) the ultimate 
class of beneficiaries of the organization's activities, and (3) the rela-
tionship of the function it performs for the other charities to their 
overall operations. 
The Appellate Tax Board, upholding the tax assessment, had held 
that "the character of those participating in the benefits of the laundry 
facility . . . is not of great materiality in resolving the question of 
exemption."17 The Supreme Judicial Court's disagreement was founded 
on the implication of the significant case law in this area. In Assessors 
of Boston v. Boston Pilots' Relief Society,18 the organization was 
denied tax exemption, in part because the members were entitled to 
its benefits as a matter of legal right rather than on the basis of need. 
In contrast to this case is M.l. T. Student House, Inc. v. Board of As-
sessors of Boston.19 In M.l.T. Student House, the corporation was 
organized to assist needy students of M.I.T. by maintaining a house 
which provided them with room and board at a cost lower than would 
be otherwise available to them. It was held that the corporation was 
a charity, because membership in the student house was limited to 
needy students.20 Basically the same principle was applied in New 
England Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation,21 
where the issue was whether a gift to the Alumnae Association of 
Smith College was exempt from the legacy tax under provisions of 
General Laws, Chapter 65, Section 1. The Court reasoned that since 
the alumnae association's purpose was the advancement of learning 
through the medium of Smith College, the character of the major 
participant in the gift was charitable, and therefore the gift was 
exempt from the legacy tax. Thus, analogous precedent would support 
the Court's conclusion that the character of those participating in the 
benefits of the organization is a significant factor in determining 
whether the organization is a charity. 
A problem arose, however, in the application of this test to the 
association. The assessors had argued that the association more closely 
resembled a mutual benefit society, as was the situation in the Boston 
Pilots' Relief Society case, than it did a charitable organization. Simi-
lar to the members of such a society, the member hospitals in the 
association were charged for the services which the association per-
formed. As the Court pointed out, however, that fact alone did not 
necessarily destroy the association's charitable character. In the M.l. T. 
Student House case, the Court held that although the needy students 
17 Record at 18. 
18311 Mass. 232, 40 N.E.2d 889 (1942). Each member of the society was required 
to pay a substantial admission fee, annual dues, and a large initial assessment in 
return for payments to him or his estate upon his death. Id. at 237, 40 N.E.2d at 892. 
19350 Mass. 539, 215 N.E.2d 788 (1966), noted in 1966 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§21.12. 
20Id. at 541, 215 N.E.2d at 790. 
21 327 Mass. 113, 97 N.E.2d 164 (1951). 
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made certain payments to the corporation, their cooperative living 
arrangement did result in a reduced cost to each student, and there-
fore was in furtherance of the corporation's general charitable pur-
pose.22 The underlying rationale for this principle is that so long as 
the organization is organized as a nonprofit venture and so long as 
the organization renders services at a lower fee than would otherwise 
be charged, it may still be charitable regardless of the fact that it re-
ceives some payment for its services.23 Applying the same rationale 
to the association, it can be said that although the association had 
charged for its services, it was a nonprofit venture. Also, it may be 
reasonably inferred from the facts that the association, being a co-
operative laundry arrangement, similar to the cooperative living 
arrangement in the M.I.T. Student House case, reduced the member 
hospitals' costs. The findings of fact on this point were vague, but 
it is reasonable to assume one central laundry facility was more 
economical than six laundries operated separately by each hospital. 
There is an additional distinction. In a mutual benefit society the 
benefits are apportioned to the members, regardless of whether they 
are needy individuals. The association's benefits, however, are avail-
able only to hospitals which are charitable in character, and this, the 
Court held, was sufficient to meet the test. The character-of-the-partici-
pant requirement seems intended to assure that those benefited are 
worthy of aid. The Court's holding that the character-of-the-partici-
pants test is met when the participants are charitable, as well as when 
the participants are needy, would appear to be justified. 
The second point emphasized by the Court was the importance 
of ascertaining who the ultimate class of beneficiaries are. It has long 
been the rule in the Commonwealth that: 
an institution will be classed as charitable if the dominant pur-
pose of its work is for the public good and the work done by its 
members is but a means adopted for this purpose. But if the 
dominant purpose of its work is to benefit its members or a 
limited class, it will not be so classed, even though the public 
will derive an incidental benefit from such work.24 
The assessors argued that the association was of the latter type since 
the patients in the hospitals served received only an incidental benefit, 
while the dominant purpose of the association was to benefit its 
limited group of member hospitals. In essence, the assessors were 
arguing that the association did not fall within the classic definition 
of a charity because its activities were not "for the benefit of an in-
definite number of persons."25 The Court was unwilling to apply this 
22350 Mass. 539, 541-542, 215 N.E.2d 788, 790-791 (1966). 
23 See Thornton v. Franklin Square House, 200 Mass. 465, 466-467, 86 N.E. 909, 
910 (1909). 
24 Massachusetts Medical Society v. Assessors of Boston, 340 Mass. 327, 332, 164 
N.E.2d 325, 328 (1960). 
25 See Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 556 (1867). 
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test in terms solely of the immediate recipients of the benefit. The 
Court stated that "the hospitals in the alliance and Association are 
charitable corporations and the ultimate class of beneficiaries is the 
general public."26 In eifect, the Court was willing to treat the member 
hospitals as conduits, and to allocate to the association "the indefinite 
class" served by the member hospitals. Treating the hospitals as con-
duits is valid because, in situations where charitable organizations 
are benefited, they cannot absorb this benefit for themselves, but must 
necessarily pass on this benefit to the general public whom they serve. 
Perhaps to balance its extension of the previously mentioned tests, 
the Court stressed the relationship of the function performed by the 
association to operations of the charities involved. The Appellate Tax 
Board had found, as a matter of fact, that the processing of laundry 
was "only an incidental part of an overall hospital operation, although 
an important one."27 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court drew 
what it termed necessary inferences from the facts: namely, a laundry 
is an integral28 and indispensable21l part in a hospital'S operation. 
The question arises whether the function performed by an organiza-
tion for a charity must be incidental, important, integral, or indis-
pensable to that charity'S operation. 
The Appellate Tax Board stated that if Children's and the other 
hospitals were allowed to form an organization, such as the associa-
tion, whose real estate would be tax exempt, nothing would prevent 
these allied hospitals from establishing organizations similar to the 
association to handle any number of hospital-related activities.30 To 
this contention, the Supreme Judicial Court stated: "There has been 
no finding that [anyone of these hospital related activities] ... is 
'an incidental part of the overall hospital operation: "31 From the 
language of the Court, it would appear that, although the particular 
function performed by the association was an integral and indis-
pensable part of the hospitals' operations, the third test would be 
satisfied if the function performed was merely incidentaP2 to a 
charity's overall operation. 
In summary, it may be said that an organization will be "chari-
261967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1159, 227 N.E.2d at 914. 
27 Record at 14. 
281967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1159, 227 N.E.2d at 914. 
29Id. at 1I56, 227 N.E.2d at 912. 
30 Record at 17. "What would prevent this same group of allied hospitals from 
taking title to a large chemical plant and manufacturing drugs for their use; or a 
bakery, or a machine tool company to produce surgical instruments, or a plant for 
manufacturing surgical dressings or x·ray machines, et cetera." Id. 
311967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1I58, 227 N.E.2d at 913. 
32 Although "incidental," as it is commonly used, may be defined as "occurring 
merely by chance or without intention or calculation," Webster's Third New Inter-
national Dictionary 1142 (1963), the more reasonable definition of "incidental," as 
used in the context of the opinion, would be "something necessary, appertaining to, 
or depending upon another which is termed the principal." Black's Law Dictionary 
904·905 (4th ed. 1951). If the latter definition is not assumed, then the third 
criterion enunciated by the Court would be meaningless in practical application. 
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table" under the tax exemption statute if each of the following three 
tests is satisfied: (1) the organization's members are needy or chari-
table, (2) the general public is benefited either immediately, or ulti-
mately through conduit member organizations, and (3) the function 
performed for the organization's members is an incidental part of 
their overall operation. The Supreme Judicial Court's decision is 
undoubtedly an expansion of existing law. For the first time, the 
Court has recognized that an organization whose purpose is to assist 
charitable organizations in the performance of their charitable works 
is itself charitable in nature. Although the Court did expand the 
law in this area, it was able to do so consistently with the rationale 
underlying prior case law. Also, the test used by the Court in reach-
ing its decision appears to be a judicially manageable standard for 
application in future decisions. 
The shortcoming of the Court's decision arises not from the holding 
or the rationale, but rather from reasonable inferences which may be 
drawn from the Court's dicta. The inference is that the Court, in the 
future, will consider as irrelevant the question of whether an organiza-
tion claiming a tax-exempt charitable status competes with commercial 
industry, and that the Court, moreover, will construe tax exemption 
statutes liberally in favor of organizations claiming tax-exempt status 
as charitable organizations. 
The Appellate Tax Board was of the opinion that the association 
and organizations similar to it would have an unfair advantage over 
commercial industry if they were allowed to compete with it and still 
retain their tax-exempt status.33 In response, the Court held that 
since the hospitals had traditionally provided their own laundry, there 
was no basis for finding competition with commercial industry.34 The 
Court, however, stated: 
We are sure that the legislature never intended to impose restric-
tive limitations upon the efforts of these charitable organizations 
to perform their service to the public in as efficient a manner as 
possible or to force up the already high costs to hospital patients.35 
This, it is submitted, is a precarious position. If an organization can 
claim exemption as a charitable organization despite the fact that it 
competes with commercial industry, one can imagine situations in 
which an enterprising officer of a charitable corporation, through an 
alliance with similar charitable corporations, could detrimentally 
affect numerous commercial industries in his zealousness to reduce 
corporate expenditures.36 Moreover, an additional consequence would 
be to reduce the community'S tax basis inordinately, since there would 
be no tax revenue on the properties utilized by such corporations. 
The Commonwealth's tax revenue from those businesses which had 
33 See Record at 17. 
341967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1157, 228 N.E.2d at 913. 
35 Id. at 1158, 227 N.E.2d at 913. 
36 See id. at 1157-1158, 227 N.E.2d at 913. 
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formerly dealt with the charitable corporations would be substantially 
less because of the businesses' reduced income. Furthermore, such a 
holding would amount to a liberal construction of the tax exemption 
statute contrary to the traditional strict construction rule.37 It is sub-
mitted, therefore, that in some situations the question of whether the 
organization claiming tax exemption competes with private industry 
may be relevant, and should be considered by the courts. 
BRIAN J. QUINN 
37 Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Assessors of Boston, 315 Mass. 712, 716, 54 
N.E.2d 199, 201 (1944); Animal Rescue League of Boston v. Assessors of Bourne, 
310 Mass. 330, 332, 37 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (1941). 
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